“苹果税”的法经济学分析——兼评金鑫诉苹果案不公平高价认定部分

• 作者： 兰磊 ¹
• 作者单位：
  1.  华东政法大学知识产权学院
• 提交时间：2024-08-02

摘要: 随着移动经济的蓬勃发展，苹果应用商店在全球范围内屡遭质疑。其间关涉的一个核心问题是，它收取的交易佣金（谑称“苹果税”）是否具有正当性。佣金包含对运营成本的补偿、特定服务的对价，以及生态系统的价值回报。质疑者往往对佣金作狭隘定位，实质是试图通过缴纳少量费用享受巨大的生态系统价值。不公平高价制度的本质是反对垄断地位，属于变相的行业管制，有悖市场经济的逻辑，与平台经济尤难适配。按照公认指标，也难以认定苹果税构成不公平高价。应用商店具有倾斜定价的双边市场特征，细分群组间亦存在交叉补贴，这是商业模式使然。这种差别待遇以及法域间的佣金差异也不大可能损害竞争。公共政策对应用商店的不当干预反而会扭曲竞争。

Abstract: With the boom in the mobile economy, the Apple App Store has been widely and frequently questioned on a global scale. One of the central issues is the legitimacy of the commission it charges on transactions (known as the "Apple tax").The commission consist of compensation for its operating costs, consideration for specific services, and a return on the value of the ecosystem. Skeptics tend to narrowly characterize the commission, which is essentially an attempt to enjoy significant ecosystem value for a small fee. The excessive pricing doctrine essentially condemns the monopoly status, is a disguised form of sectoral regulation, and contrary to the logic of the market economy; it is particularly difficult to fit with the platform economy. According to recognized benchmarks for judging excessive pricing, it is also difficult to conclude that the Apple tax constitutes excessive pricing. App stores have the two-sided market characteristic of skewed pricing, and cross-subsidization exists between subgroups, which is the inherent result of this business model. This differential treatment, as well as differences in commissions between jurisdictions charged by App Store, is also unlikely to harm competition. Rather, undue public policy intervention in app stores could distort competition.

• 来自： 兰磊
• 分类： 法学 >> 经济法学 应用经济学 >> 产业经济学
• 稿件状态： 已投稿期刊
• 引用： PSSXiv:202408.01022 (或此版本 PSSXiv:202408.01022V1)
  DOI:10.12451/202408.01022
  CSTR:32012.36.PSSXiv.202408.01022
• 推荐引用方式： 兰磊.“苹果税”的法经济学分析——兼评金鑫诉苹果案不公平高价认定部分.哲学社会科学预印本平台:https://zsyyb.cn/abs/202408.01022.[PSSXiv:202408.01022V1] (点此复制)